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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)1 is a law that 
nearly all legal scholars love to hate. As an industry-backed 
response to the radical advances in digital technology and 
network communications, the relevant terms of the law seem 
broadly consistent with a view that the DMCA was intended to 
protect the then-existing distribution models for copyrighted 
content during an era of great transition.2 Put more directly, 
Hollywood called for action, and Congress (and the President) 
responded.3 Given this backdrop, the dominant understanding 
among observers and commentators is that the DMCA altered 
the inherent balance in copyright law between the copyright 
owners (e.g., Hollywood) and the public (e.g., users or consumers) 
in favor of the copyright owners.4 
This Essay suggests that a reconceptualization of the DMCA 
may be in order. Rather than looking at the anticircumvention 
provisions of the DMCA as moving the fulcrum along the 
copyright scale, I urge that we consider anticircumvention as a 
law addressing the regulatory effects of technology.5 In the 
anticircumvention provisions, Congress did not in fact alter the 
balance between copyright owners and the public—very few 
users of copyrighted goods are implicated by these rules.6 
                                                          
 1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).  
 2. See Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501, 502 (2003) (noting that supporters of the DMCA find the 
provision “necessary to prevent unauthorized copying of copyrighted works in the digital 
environment”). 
 3. See, e.g., John Schwartz, The Net Impact of the New Copyright Bill, WASH. POST, 
May 18, 1998, Washington Business, at 27 (stating that the main supporters of the DMCA 
are influential holders of copyrights in the entertainment industry). 
 4. The DMCA is heavily discussed in legal literature. Indeed, a recent Westlaw 
search (in the “JLR” database) identified at least 53 articles using the term “DMCA” in 
the title, and more than 1480 containing the term. Notwithstanding the volume, this 
Author is aware of only two prominent defenses of the anticircumvention provisions of the 
DMCA in print. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of 
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1636 (2001) (arguing in favor of 
anticircumvention provisions); Orin S. Kerr, A Lukewarm Defense of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 163, 163–70 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002). 
 5. There are multiple provisions of the DMCA. This Essay is concerned only with 
what are generally described as the “anticircumvention” and “copyright information 
integrity” provisions. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1202 (2000). For simplicity, references to the 
DMCA or to “anticircumvention” should be understood to mean these sections of Title 17. 
 6. The DMCA’s anticircumvention rules broadly target the development, use, and 
distribution of circumvention technologies. See infra Part III. A user who makes an 
unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work (irrespective of whether that work was made 
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Instead, Congress attempted to alter the balance between law 
and software to respond to changes in the enforcement 
environment by shifting the regulatory equilibrium back towards 
the law. Therefore, these statutory provisions are perhaps the 
first major example of an emerging feature of the modern 
regulatory environment: the direct manipulation of regulatory 
effects on software code via the law—or what I describe as “legal 
preemption.”7 
Legal preemption is a creature of the digital, networked 
age—an era when goods, services, contracts, transactional 
communications, and enforcement mechanisms are all just 
collections of bits streaming through the global data networks. In 
2005 it is a cliché to observe that software code has important 
regulatory effects in this environment—as Lessig put so adroitly, 
“code is law.”8 
It is well understood that the line between products and the 
contracts that govern them, if there ever was a meaningful line, 
is growing increasingly indistinct. It is further understood that 
underlying legal concepts, such as property-like rights granted by 
copyright law, are a foundation (albeit an important one) for the 
product-contract transactions they support. But recognition does 
not necessarily lead to real understanding. What is often lost in 
the code-is-law perspective is the broader view of the modern 
regulatory environment as equilibrium between the software and 
legal “codes.”9 Under this view, law and technology are linked, 
and it is the interaction between the two that determines the 
regulatory effects.10 
Recasting legal code and software code as complementary, 
rather than as pure substitutes, leads to a number of important 
observations. First, all discussion of regulation in the transaction 
of digital goods must consider both legal and technological 
dimensions of the enforcement equation; looking at law or 
software in isolation simply misses the point.11 Second, the 
development of regulatory policy in this new digital era offers 
                                                          
available via the circumvention of protection technology) is not legally affected by the 
DMCA. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 8. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) 
(explaining that “the software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is regulate 
cyberspace as it is”). 
 9. See R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457, 465–77 
(2005). 
 10. Id. at 468–70. 
 11. Id. at 465–74. 
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both perils and promise.12 On the one hand, traditional 
lawmakers control less of the regulatory framework than ever 
before and lack important information about the true effects of 
any legal intervention.13 On the other hand, legal code remains 
enormously powerful, and the legislative and judicial options 
have just expanded.14 
It is on this last point that this Essay will focus. When law 
and software together create the net regulatory environment, 
policymakers will necessarily affect more than the simple 
allocation of rights among competing parties (here, for example, 
among content owners and the consuming public); they will also 
affect the location of the law-software interface.15 In other words, 
modern regulatory policy implicates both the substance and the 
mechanism of regulation, and establishes the mixture between 
legal code and software code.16 Thus enters the era of legal 
preemption: the attempt to use legal mechanisms to directly alter 
the law-software equilibrium. The DMCA’s anticircumvention 
provisions, by squarely addressing the technological aspects of 
the regulatory environment for copyrighted goods,17 represent a 
first look at this brave new world of legal preemption. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part II lays the foundation 
by drawing on earlier related work to develop an analytic outline 
for the digital regulatory environment. Rejecting the simplistic 
mantra of code-is-law, this new analytic outline emphasizes the 
dynamic and often unpredictable interaction between legal code 
and software code, as well as the important implications of 
different code mixtures. The analytic outline recognizes that 
legal code and software code regulate in very different ways, with 
different strengths, weaknesses, costs, and benefits. Indeed, 
there are good reasons to believe that software regulation can 
have undesirable effects, that it will substitute speed and 
effectiveness for flexibility and critical enforcement “safety 
valves.” A policy mandate for more law and less software is 
perhaps best met via the use of legal preemption or the direct 
alteration of the law-software regulatory interface. 
                                                          
 12. Id. at 474–77. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property 
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 8–17 (2004) (examining the expansion of copyright 
protections). 
 15. Wagner, supra note 9, at 474; elaborated upon infra Part II.  
 16. Wagner, supra note 9, at 470–74; elaborated upon infra Part II.C. 
 17. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). 
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Part III picks up this thread and considers the DMCA’s 
anticircumvention provisions as a form of legal preemption. That 
is, given the context established in Part II, Congress’s choice of 
statutory provisions is revealing: Rather than addressing the 
users of infringing goods, Congress clearly sought to affect the 
way that technology would be deployed. Importantly, the 
anticircumvention provisions have multifaceted effects on 
software regulation. In the near term, the law seeks to alter the 
current law-software mixture: simultaneously encouraging some 
forms of software code while banning others. The longer-term 
effects are perhaps even more significant: the DMCA provisions 
seem reasonably likely to reduce incentives for faster 
development of technologies that would further alter the 
equilibrium between law and software. That the DMCA might, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom, actually limit the 
development and deployment of “digital rights management” 
(DRM) in the field of copyrighted goods could be its most 
surprising, and important, regulatory legacy. Part IV concludes. 
II. THE DIGITAL REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT18 
This Part outlines a basic analytic framework for thinking 
about the relationship between the two major regulatory modes 
of the digital regulatory environment, law and software.19 The 
core observation is that the law-software relationship is 
primarily complementary—it is fundamentally additive rather 
than subtractive. Put more simply, for a given regulatory 
condition, the impact of law—cases, statutes, and so on—will 
deeply influence the impact of software. Conceptually, the idea is 
to think in terms of equilibrium, the natural resting point on the 
law-software interface. 
The analytic framework developed and explored here is 
based on the following premises: 
(a) Both legal code and software code have regulatory 
effects; 
                                                          
 18. This Part is based on a far more detailed treatment of this issue in an earlier 
work. See Wagner, supra note 9. 
 19. As Lessig has aptly noted, social norms and the marketplace will have 
important regulatory effects in cyberspace, as they do in realspace. Lawrence Lessig, 
Commentary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 
507–10 (1999). For simplicity, and because the most interesting interaction for the 
purposes of the online legal environment is that between law and software, the effects of 
norms and the market will be noted less systematically, though their most important 
effects will be described. 
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(b) Legal effects and software effects are interrelated—a 
change in one regulatory mode will affect the other (at least 
over the medium-to-long term); and 
(c) The total regulatory condition is the product of both 
legal regulatory effects and software regulatory effects. 
Figure 1, below, depicts the basic point here graphically. 
 
Figure 1. The Law-Software Interface 
Here, the axes represent the effects (or impact) of the two 
regulatory modes, law (y-axis) and software (x-axis). A greater 
regulatory effect means a greater impact on behavior; for 
example, in a paradigmatic property rights case, greater 
regulatory effect means greater protection to property owners. 
The total regulatory effect is the area defined by the law-software 
interface. Consider regulatory Condition A above, with a given 
legal impact (here, 4), and software effect (here, 2). In the Figure 
1 construct, the equilibrium condition is depicted as point a (2,4), 
and the total regulatory effect is designated as 2 x 4 = 8. 
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In the digital information goods context, Condition A in 
Figure 1 represents the total appropriability provided to the 
creator of an expressive intellectual good: the copyright. The 
legal regulatory effects are established primarily by the 
protections and limitations of Title 17 of the U.S. Code.20 The 
technological effects include both the availability of protection-
enhancing software, such as DRM, as well as the existence of 
what Tim Wu describes as antiregulatory code—software that 
undermines the appropriability of the work.21 What is important 
for establishing the equilibrium, and thus total appropriation, 
are the net effects of each regulatory system, law and software. 
A. Equilibrium at the Law-Software Interface 
Having established a basic understanding of the law-
software equilibrium through Figure 1, it becomes crucial to 
understand the response mechanisms that produce this 
condition. One important point is that the responses can be 
expected to flow in both directions: Legal conditions will provoke 
a technological response, and technological circumstances can 
prompt legal changes. In the digital environment, neither legal 
nor software code exists in a vacuum; their tight coexistence 
creates a continual feedback loop. 
Note that the equilibrium response posited here, for both law 
and software, is driven by private cost-benefit considerations.22 
Put most directly, equilibrium at the law-software interface is 
determined by the contextual cost-benefit functions of the law 
and software regulatory mechanisms. For example, given a legal 
regulatory condition, greater software regulation will be deployed 
(moving the equilibrium point to the right in Figure 1 above) 
where it is cost effective to do so (where the gains outweigh the 
costs). In the copyright context, evaluating this net legal impact 
presents content owners with a choice concerning whether to 
                                                          
 20. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332. 
 21. The canonical example, and the one discussed in detail by Wu, is peer-to-peer 
software products, which allow for the easy—and only partially susceptible to 
regulation—exchange of copyrighted goods (typically music or movies) between network 
users. Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 726–45 (2003). Note that the 
impact of both law and software must be considered on a net basis. Just as software in the 
digital-goods context has both pro-protection and antiprotection effects, the Copyright Act 
provides both legal protections and legal limitations. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (detailing a 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights in a copyrighted work), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (codifying 
the “fair use” defense to unauthorized use of a copyrighted work). 
 22. It also represents average behavior. Obviously, in the absence of explicit 
restrictions otherwise, individual responses to legal effects will vary. The figures here are 
intended to convey the overall average response rather than suggest that all players will 
behave the same. 
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deploy software-based regulatory mechanisms. For example, 
content owners could implement a strong regime of DRM, 
seeking to prevent unauthorized access to the work via 
technology. The use of this technique will increase the level of 
protection, though it obviously comes with a series of related 
costs, both monetary and otherwise. Ultimately, of course, 
deployment will depend on the net software effects—the gains to 
be had from additional software regulation—given the extant 
legal protection. Thus, under this example, the location of point a 
in Figure 1 is a function of these calculations. Again, this is the 
central lesson of cyberlaw: Regulatory effect (here, total 
protection) is the product of law and software.23 
B. Dynamic Effects 
Fleshing out this basic framework requires a few more 
details. Perhaps the most important and most straightforward of 
these observations is that the law-software interface is 
profoundly dynamic.24 That conditions change, of course, is 
unremarkable. What makes the dynamic effects of the modern 
regulatory environment noteworthy is the interrelationship 
between the two regulatory modes; as described above, the 
complementary relationship implies that changes along one 
dimension will (certainly over the long term) yield changes in the 
other.25 From a policy perspective, this observation is crucially 
important: It means that policy adjustments in the digital 
context cannot merely be contemplated as one-dimensional 
changes (or paradigmatically to legal scholars, as changes in the 
legal environment). A complete policy proposal or analysis in this 
arena cannot afford to overlook the dynamics of the law-software 
relationship. That is, a proposal for legal change is incomplete 
without predictions concerning the software response to such a 
change: As noted above, it is the product of law and software 
effects that determines the overall regulatory environment. 
                                                          
 23. Note also that the response effects do not flow in only one direction. 
Technological circumstances can drive legal changes. 
 24. Indeed, this dynamism—driven primarily by technological (software) changes—
is fundamentally why the relationship between law and technology is so evidently 
important in this area of the law, while it garners relatively less attention in other areas. 
 25. Obviously, there are quite likely to be short-term effects where responses to 
change in one regulatory mode are small to nonexistent. Given the nature of the 
legislative and judicial systems, one can expect these transitional effects to have more 
significance in slowing legal changes in response to software developments than vice-
versa. 
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Consider, for example, Figure 2, depicting changes in 
conditions. 
 
Figure 2. The Interplay Between Regulatory Effects 
 
Figure 2 generally describes a change in legal regulatory effects 
(a decrease from 4 to 2, for example, when the law reduces a class 
of ownership rights), and explores the implications of various 
technological responses. Points b, c, d, and e describe a range of 
possible software responses, each yielding a very different overall 
regulatory environment. Condition B is the case where there are 
no long-term software effects, perhaps because of the high cost of 
the software regulatory mode; the appropriate software may not 
meaningfully exist, or for example, it may be too inflexible to be 
useful.26 In this case, total regulatory effect reduces from 8 in 
Condition A (2 x 4) to 4 in Condition B (2 x 2). Given a utilitarian 
model, one would thus expect a change in the output or 
development of the protected or regulated good in Condition B; 
for example, if the regulatory environment for music or movies 
changed, one would expect a change in output. This could be 
                                                          
 26. A bit of foreshadowing: Another possibility for Condition B, which I discuss 
more fully in Part II.D below, is that the legal regulation directly affects the quantity or 
nature of the software regulation, which I describe as legal preemption. 
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either a positive or negative change, depending on a variety of 
assumptions about the development environment. For purposes 
of the illustration here, the direction and magnitude of the 
output-effects are unimportant. 
Condition C in Figure 2 describes the circumstance where 
software effects increase at least marginally in response to the 
decreasing legal regulatory effects. For example, the expansion of 
“fair use” exceptions to copyright infringement might yield an 
increased reliance on DRM-based solutions. This increase in 
software effects in Condition C, however, does not make up for 
the reduced legal effects, and the overall regulatory effects drop 
to 6 (3 x 2). As above, one should expect a change in output. 
Condition D illustrates an increase in software effects of a 
magnitude that renders no net change in the regulatory 
environment. Here, law and software are roughly fungible, at 
least from a net regulatory effects perspective.27 There should be 
little, if any, change in overall output in the shift from Condition 
A to Condition D. 
Condition E describes an unlikely—but not implausible—
scenario: The reduction in legal effects prompts a technological 
response of such magnitude that it actually increases the overall 
regulatory effect. This could occur, for example, if the increase in 
resources devoted to research and development (R&D) of 
software regulatory techniques (spurred by the drop in legal 
effects) yielded a breakthrough in cost effectiveness, allowing 
greatly increased deployment of software mechanisms. Perhaps a 
reduction in the legal force of copyright law spurred R&D into 
DRM systems that enabled huge advances in effectiveness to be 
made.28 
The point of working through each of the conditions in 
Figure 2 is to illustrate the critical attention that must be paid to 
the law-software interface in the new regulatory context. Without 
an understanding of whether the software response point will be 
b, c, d, or e, the best-laid policy plans seem likely to go awry. The 
intertwined relationship of law and software demands careful 
consideration of each. Code is not equivalent to law, a point that 
matters crucially in the modern legal-policy environment. 
                                                          
 27. As discussed in some additional detail below and elsewhere, they are clearly not 
truly fungible even in this case. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 9. 
 28. An example might be “unbreakable” digital rights management (DRM) systems, 
or even copy-protected CDs that work reliably. Note that Condition E could also occur 
where cost-effective software responses are profoundly inflexible, essentially forcing 
deployment of more effective protections. 
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C. A Few Implications of Software Regulation 
Understanding the basic framework developed above leads 
naturally to at least two important observations. The first is 
dynamism: The analysis of policy options in the cyberspace 
context will necessarily be dynamic in nature, requiring 
consideration of not only (for example) legal adjustments, but 
also predicting the responsive effects such changes will stimulate 
in software regulation. Further, because of the nature of 
technological change, even stable law-software equilibria are 
unlikely to remain so permanently. 
The second observation, and the one central to this Essay, is 
that policy development in this context must consider both the 
desired net regulatory effects—for example, how much real 
protection to offer copyright owners—as well as the appropriate 
mechanism—the mixture of law and software. That is, law and 
software both regulate, but they are far from the same: they 
regulate in very different ways, are controlled differently (if at 
all) by traditional governmental authorities, and have quite 
different effects. Regulation in the digital era has an additional 
dimension, and the location of the law-software equilibrium may 
well be as important as the overall regulatory effect. 
Indeed, as I have argued at length elsewhere, there is good 
reason to conclude that the overreliance on software code as a 
regulatory mechanism is not socially beneficial. The basic 
features of software code include: 
• Preprogramming. Software regulation operates in a 
relatively fixed, rigid fashion in determining regulatory 
outcomes. The programmed algorithm is followed without 
deviation; circumstances outside the scope of the 
programmer’s imagination, for example, are not considered. 
• A narrow range of inputs. Software regulatory 
mechanisms use a predetermined—and typically narrow—
range of inputs in implementing the regulatory rules. The 
quantity, scope, and nature of these inputs are often 
significantly constrained by the creativity of the 
programmer, the complexity or sophistication of the 
software itself, or the environment in which it operates. 
• Self-containment. The point here is obvious: Software-
implemented regulations are free-standing mechanisms and 
do not generally require recourse to other institutional 
players for enforcement and rule determinations.29 This 
                                                          
 29. This is not to say that software regulation will not access external resources, 
such as databases, for information or assistance. Rather, the observation is that software 
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contrasts with more typical legal regulation, which 
generally requires recourse to other institutions or 
players—courts, arbitrators, prosecutors, regulatory 
bodies—for decisionmaking related to enforcement. 
• Marginal costlessness. Software regulatory operations are 
generally unaffected by the quantity of use. 
Of course, these features of software regulation may look 
like just that—features. Software offers a reliable, unwavering, 
relatively simple, and, at least potentially, inexpensive means to 
implement regulations. And yet these same features also have 
serious negative implications, including the lack of regulatory 
“safety valves,” the elimination of marginal enforcement costs, 
and the potentially troubling public effects of software scalability. 
1. Software-Based Regulation Lacks Regulatory Safety 
Valves. Even under legal schemes that demand little or no 
intervention on the part of third-party regulatory institutions, 
such as property-backed contracts, there nonetheless exist a 
number of safety valves that ensure that private arrangements 
conform to acknowledged boundaries of social practice. These 
safety valves can be explicit; examples include the doctrine of 
unconscionability in contract law (which serves to ensure that 
agreements are entered into voluntarily), unfair competition law 
(which serves to ensure that private dealings do not stifle the 
functioning of the market), and even issues of broader social 
values, such as principles of nondiscrimination. Or they can be 
less formal, such as the restraint encouraged by public 
enforcement of contract law, which may subject the author to 
unwanted publicity. By obviating the need to seek recourse from 
third-party enforcement institutions—such as courts or 
regulators—software regulation can “fly under the radar,” 
avoiding the oversight, both formal and informal, that occurs in 
even the least interventionist forms of legal regulation, such as 
property backed contractual relationships. This in turn implies 
that the typical forces that, in effect, tend to normalize what 
otherwise appears to be purely private dealings will have 
substantially less impact where software is concerned. 
2. Software Regulation Can Eliminate Marginal 
Enforcement Costs. It is axiomatic that the enforcement of legal 
rights will not occur where the enforcement costs outweigh the 
expected gains.30 While enforcement costs are often viewed as a 
                                                          
mechanisms inherently combine information collection, rule analysis, and enforcement. 
 30. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–16 (1960) 
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social drag, their function of allowing for some low-level 
violations of rights can be in many cases beneficial; hence, the 
concept of “efficient breach” in contract law. This effect of 
enforcement costs is especially well understood in the area of 
intellectual property, where allowing the broadest possible 
dissemination of intellectual creations—consistent with 
maintaining appropriate development incentives—is a core 
value.31 
In the software regulation context, marginal enforcement 
costs are essentially zero. Thus, one can predict with confidence 
that enforcement costs will not be accounted for—they do not 
exist—and that the effects noted above will not be realized. 
3. Software Regulation May Scale Poorly. While, as a 
general matter, software scales well—its behavioral features 
remain unchanged as the quantity of activity increases—the 
scaling features of software may have potentially troubling public 
effects. For one thing, software regulation is likely to become 
increasingly vulnerable to countermeasures as the scale of its use 
increases;32 it is well established that popular or widely used 
software most encourages the sort of research that would either 
reveal latent bugs in the software or develop effective 
countermeasures.33 Further, software regulation is unlikely to 
fail gracefully. Once bugs or countermeasures are discovered, the 
effectiveness of the particular regulatory mechanism is 
                                                          
(asserting that the “rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in 
the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs 
which would be involved in bringing it about”). 
 31. See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the 
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1001–02 (2003) (noting the tension 
between an incentive to produce and the desire to promote creativity and invention). 
 32. This situation is exacerbated by an institutional tendency to underreport 
potential defects at the performance testing stage prior to release. See, e.g., H. Jeff Smith 
& Mark Keil, The Reluctance to Report Bad News on Troubled Software Projects: A 
Theoretical Model, 13 INFO. SYS. J. 69, 70 (2003) (describing how software developers and 
project managers are often unwilling to report the actual status of a “troubled project”); 
Lisa Liberty Becker, Telling the Truth Can Be Hazardous to Your Job, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Apr. 6, 2003, at G9 (observing the tendency to dismiss or minimize bad news in the 
quality assurance context). See generally RTI, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF INADEQUATE 
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR SOFTWARE TESTING (2002) (studying the impact of inadequate 
software testing on the economy). 
 33. See, e.g., Christopher Jones, Internet Hacking for Dummies, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 
20, 1998, http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,10459,00.html. Eric Raymond 
famously made a similar point in the context of the open source movement, noting that 
“‘[g]iven enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.’” ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND 
THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 
41 (1999); see also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the 
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 434–36 (2002). 
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substantially diminished.34 This phenomenon—that software 
becomes increasingly vulnerable to sudden (even catastrophic) 
failure as its scale increases—again suggests that software is an 
unstable regulatory device. 
Combining the law-software framework with a recognition 
that high levels of software regulation could be unfavorable 
implies strongly that one goal (or at least consideration) of 
regulation in the digital environment should be to limit (or at 
least control) the quantity of software-based regulation.35 
D. Software Regulation and the Choice of Legal Rules:  
Legal Preemption 
In other related work, I have noted that where a regulatory 
objective is to limit the quantity of software-based enforcement in 
the overall regulatory environment, the use of property rules (as 
opposed to liability rules) is likely to be (at least weakly) favored. 
The flexibility, power, and scale of property rules enable 
participants in the marketplace to tailor a legal regime to meet 
rapidly changing circumstances.36 This Essay seeks to explore 
another form of legal rule, one that is neither property nor 
liability but instead directly controls the law-software 
equilibrium. I call this type of rule legal preemption.37 
Analytically, legal preemption is relatively straightforward: 
the use of the power of law to limit (or remove) the effect of 
software regulation. Obviously, this technique can take several 
forms, ranging from an outright ban on certain technologies,38 to 
                                                          
 34. See Dan Verton, Tech Consortium Created to Improve Software Reliability, 
COMPUTERWORLD, May 20, 2002, at 12 (noting that unreliable software costs companies 
over $175 billion per year to repair); see also Building a Better Bug-Trap, ECONOMIST, 
June 21, 2003, Technology Quarterly, at 15. See generally RTI, supra note 32 (discussing 
the effect that low-quality software has on the market, and the need for a software testing 
infrastructure that prevents the release of such software). Additionally, efforts to repair 
vulnerable or defective software systems are typically problematic. See George V. Hulme, 
Quality First: Companies Pay Up to Plug Holes, INFORMATIONWEEK, May 20, 2002, at 38 
(observing that hackers outpace the repair efforts of security administrators); Douglas 
Schweitzer, Emerging Technology: Patch Management, Patch Me If You Can!, NETWORK 
MAG., Aug. 2003, at 40 (stating that software patches are generally expensive to install on 
large networks, frequently get released with minimal testing, and often have unintended 
consequences such as causing other programs to crash). 
 35. Complete elimination of software regulation in the modern regulatory 
environment is impractical. 
 36. See Wagner, supra note 9, at 491. 
 37. See id. at 484–88 (discussing legal preemption in the cyberlaw context, and its 
role as a form of legal regulation). 
 38. An example of this is the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA), 17 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(a) (2000), which defines the range of permissible operations for “digital audio 
recording device[s]” that fall within the scope of the Act. 
(6)WAGNERG2 12/1/2005 10:35 AM 
2005] RECONSIDERING THE DMCA 1121 
enforced standardization,39 to manipulating incentives, to 
developing and deploying either desired or undesired forms of 
software regulation. The different forms of legal preemption may 
be used individually or as a mixture. (As discussed below, the 
DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions are an example of multiple 
forms of legal preemption in action.) 
It should also be noted that legal preemption is not entirely 
a creature of the Internet: Regulators in many contexts have 
attempted to use the direct regulation of technology to affect the 
overall regulatory-marketplace environment. An outright ban on 
theft-enabling technologies, such as cable descramblers, is an 
extreme example.40 A somewhat more subtle example is the use 
of prescribed efficiency and safety standards to regulate the 
automobile market.41 The point here is that, in an era in which 
traditional legal leverage is waning, and more “technological” 
regulatory opportunities are emerging, we are likely to see an 
increase in the use of legal preemption in the modern online 
environment. 
From a regulatory toolbox perspective, the advantages of 
legal preemption are clear.42 Most importantly, it provides a 
vehicle by which the law can directly affect the law-software 
equilibrium point.43 Instead of attempting to predict the 
technological response to a legal change,44 legal preemption has a 
far more predictable effect. Additionally, a legal preemption 
strategy—by seeking to “freeze” (or at least slow) the relevant 
software-regulatory developments—can add stability and 
certainty to an area of regulation. Finally, because legal 
preemption does not directly affect the substantive level of 
regulation (though, as noted above, it can clearly have an 
important effect) this approach may bring political advantages. 
But there are also potential concerns with a legal 
preemption approach. One potential problem is with feasibility. 
While in theory it should be possible to directly address virtually 
                                                          
 39. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) mandates 
various technical standards relating to digital broadcast television. See Edmund L. 
Andrews & Joel Brinkley, The Fight for Digital TV’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, at 
F1. 
 40. See 47 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2000). 
 41. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (2000) (establishing average fuel economy standards); 
§ 30111 (discussing safety standards for motor vehicles). 
 42. See Wagner, supra note 9, at 492–93 (“[T]he goal of a rule of legal preemption is 
fixing . . . the corresponding regulatory effects of software.”). 
 43. Id. at 485–86 (“[T]hese supportive regulations serve to stabilize the law-
software equilibrium point by reducing the incidence of at least some forms of anti-
regulatory code.”). 
 44. See supra Part II.B. 
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any software regulation with a legal rule, the rapid pace of 
development and inherent uncertainty involved in modern 
technology at least raise questions about the practicability of this 
approach. An additional problem with this approach is the fact 
that the pace of legal change (whether by legislation or judicial 
decision) typically moves comparatively slowly and often involves 
institutional actors whose competence in modern technologies is, 
to say the least, not assured.45 
A second potential problem is that the costs of error in legal 
preemption might be unusually high. The direct manipulation of 
technology could serve to “lock-in” an unfortunate set of 
circumstances, could forestall developments that might lead to 
more socially beneficial arrangements or even have more general 
unintended spillover effects on technological change. For 
example, a legal rule barring peer-to-peer technologies can be 
predicted to: (1) favor the current incumbent distributors in the 
digital media business, together with their (arguably 
inappropriate) business models; (2) substantially slow the 
current transition in digital media distribution models, delaying 
more efficient forms of this business; and (3) dissuade some 
investments into peer-to-peer and related technologies for fear of 
legal liability in the future. 
Despite these potential downsides, which are significant and 
highly plausible, there is good reason to expect that the 
policymakers of the future will turn to legal preemption 
techniques with increasing enthusiasm. First, as noted above, 
legal preemption is perhaps the most obvious way to solve the 
major regulatory challenge of our time: the shift in power from 
legal code to software code. Second, for lawmakers in an era 
where traditional, sovereign-state-based government is becoming 
increasingly marginalized, legal preemption is an attractive way 
to reposition themselves at the forefront of regulatory activity. 
III. RECASTING THE DMCA 
This Part argues that the anticircumvention provisions of 
the DMCA are a prescient example of legal preemption—a 
harbinger of what is likely to be an important mode of regulation 
in the digital era. By directly addressing the regulatory 
technology in digital media markets, the DMCA is an effort by 
                                                          
 45. See Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster, Using Antitrust Law to Advance and 
Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 573 (2002) (preferring 
specialized agencies to generalist courts that may lack expertise necessary to understand 
complex economic and technological issues surrounding digital distribution of music). 
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lawmakers to exert control over the law-software interface in one 
of the most rapidly-changing areas of the economy. 
The DMCA is a particularly important example of legal 
preemption not only because of its context. The 
anticircumvention rules have features which make them an 
interesting case study into this emerging regulatory technique. 
For example, as discussed below, the DMCA both suppresses 
technology (anticircumvention technology) as well as encourages 
technology (access control technology, or DRM): an effort to shift 
the law-software interface using both the carrot and the stick. 
Further, and perhaps most importantly, the DMCA is likely to 
limit the incentives for an “arms race” in DRM (and anti-DRM) 
technologies, thus effectively restraining the development and 
deployment of DRM. Indeed, for those who have concerns about 
the social benefits of DRM and related software-based regulatory 
technologies, the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA 
might be a positive step rather than a negative; it may well be 
that the DMCA should be understood as a law that moderated 
the growth of DRM in a critical area. 
This Part continues as follows. First, the case is briefly made 
as to why the anticircumvention provisions are best understood 
as legal preemption. Second, the DMCA’s dual approach—both 
encouraging and suppressing software regulation—is discussed. 
Finally, the way that the DMCA in effect limits the growth of 
DRM is outlined. 
A. Anticircumvention as Legal Preemption 
The most relevant of the DMCA’s anticircumvention 
provisions are codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201, and read in part: 
(a) Violations Regarding Circumvention of Technological 
Measures.— 
(1)(A) No person shall circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title. . . .  
. . . . 
(2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the 
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, 
product, service, device, component, or part thereof, 
that— 
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose 
of circumventing . . . ; 
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(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose 
or use other than to circumvent . . . ; or 
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in 
concert with that person with that person’s knowledge 
for use in circumventing . . . .  
 . . . . 
(b) Additional Violations.— 
(1) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the 
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, 
product, service, device, component, or part thereof, 
that— 
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose 
of circumventing protection . . . ; 
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose 
or use other than to circumvent protection . . . ; or 
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in 
concert with that person with that person’s knowledge 
for use in circumventing protection . . . .46 
Broadly, the anticircumvention provisions prohibit the use, 
development, or distribution of technologies which are designed 
to “circumvent” (e.g., hack, crack, or break) access control 
systems (or DRM). There are a couple of important points here. 
First, the anticircumvention provisions squarely address 
technology, not copyright.47 That is, the terms of the rules are 
related to copyright only in the sense that the “circumvention” 
that is prohibited is one which voids an access control on a 
copyrighted work. Otherwise, copyright laws—the rights, 
limitations, and remedies afforded owners and the public—are 
not implicated. 
Second, the anticircumvention rules do not generally affect 
the users of copyrighted work. By their nature, these 
technologies are likely to be rather esoteric, the province of 
sophisticated computer users.48 Thus, the quantity of users of a 
                                                          
 46. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)–(b) (2000). 
 47. See JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL 
MILLENNIUM § 2.07[1] (2005) (“Section 1201 . . . is not part of copyright law and was never 
intended to be so. . . . Its focus is . . . entirely on access to copyrighted 
works. . . . Copyright law has never, and does not now, prohibit unauthorized access to 
copyright works.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement in the Internet Age: 
The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. 
L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2001) (“[T]he new anti-circumvention laws prevent sophisticated users 
(6)WAGNERG2 12/1/2005 10:35 AM 
2005] RECONSIDERING THE DMCA 1125 
copyrighted work that are implicated by the anticircumvention 
provisions will be small. Also, note that the relevant provisions of 
the DMCA do not prohibit any particular use of the copyrighted 
work, irrespective of whether DRM was circumvented. Thus, the 
overwhelming majority of users will be in the same position after 
the DMCA as before it. 
Therefore, because these provisions of the DMCA (1) directly 
address technologies, their creation, and their distribution; (2) do 
not directly alter the underlying copyright balance between 
creators and users (e.g., the substance of the copyright law is not 
changed); and (3) do not implicate the vast majority of the users 
of a copyright work (even one which is protected by DRM), the 
DMCA is not really a law about copyright. It is instead a law 
about technology. More specifically, it is a law that seeks to 
define the relationship between the legal code and software code. 
The anticircumvention rules are a clear example of legal 
preemption—the use of the law to (try to) control the code. 
B. Encouragement and Suppression of Software Regulation 
Even beyond the fact of legal preemption, the DMCA’s basic 
structure has an interesting feature: it simultaneously 
suppresses and encourages technology. That is, on the one hand 
it encourages the deployment of “access control” technologies on 
copyrighted works—without them, any extra rights or remedies 
from the anticircumvention provisions are unavailable. On the 
other hand, it prohibits the use, development, or distribution of 
“circumvention” technologies.49 Thus, the DMCA can be 
understood as trying to shift the law-software equilibrium for 
copyrighted goods generally in favor of software regulation, 
though it does so in two ways: by increasing the amount of 
software code that is deployed and by prohibiting antiregulatory 
code. The expectation is plainly that the net result here will be 
an increase in software regulation—and in that sense, at least a 
potential increase in overall regulatory effect because the DMCA 
does not change the underlying substantive legal rights. 
C. The Plot Twist: How the DMCA Might Limit DRM 
From the above discussion, it seems abundantly clear that 
the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA are a form of legal 
preemption—their goal is to increase the net effects of software 
regulation in the digital copyright regime. Thus far, the proffered 
                                                          
from bypassing the technology.” (emphasis added)). 
 49. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). 
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conceptualization of the DMCA has yielded new insights, but the 
conventional wisdom about its origins and goals (as an additional 
grant of protection to the media-content creation industry) has 
been largely upheld.50 
And yet there is an important additional feature to these 
legal rules, a feature that may, in fact, change the way we think 
about the DMCA in a more fundamental way. In its structure, 
the anticircumvention rules may effectively limit the incentives 
to create ever-stronger DRM solutions. It does so in the way that 
DRM technologies are described in § 1201 as a “technological 
measure that effectively controls access.”51 The key phrase here is 
“effectively controls,” which has been interpreted (correctly, given 
the legislative context) to establish a low bar for the “strength” of 
the DRM, or its resistance to being hacked.52 This low bar is, I 
think, crucial to this aspect of the DMCA. By setting a low bar for 
the effectiveness of DRM technologies, Congress provides 
incentives to content owners to meet that low bar—at which 
point these additional incentives disappear. In other words, the 
DMCA requires only somewhat weak DRM systems to qualify for 
the protection against anticircumvention technologies; once that 
threshold is reached, the law provides no additional rewards for 
further sophistication. Of course, there may well be other, 
nonlegal, incentives that point towards stronger DRM, such as a 
response to more effective attacks or the desire to structure 
transactions in a different way. But the point here is that when 
you put together these two aspects of the DMCA’s 
anticircumvention provisions—(1) the low bar required for a 
content owner to receive protection and (2) the direct suppression 
of anticircumvention technologies—the net effect of the law will 
likely do three things. First, it will encourage the development 
and deployment of (relatively weak) DRM. Second, it will at least 
moderate the incentives to engage in an “arms race” for stronger 
DRM. Third, it will significantly suppress the incentives to use, 
develop, and distribute anticircumvention technologies of any 
kind. 
                                                          
 50. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 422–25 (1999) 
(noting that the anticircumvention provisions were a response to lobbying by the media 
industry). 
 51. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). 
 52. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441–42 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(noting that merely because a technological measure “was so easily penetrated” does not 
indicate that it does not “‘effectively control[] access’” within the meaning of 
§ 1201(a)(2)(A) (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000))). 
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This suggests that one real possibility for the long-term 
effects of the DMCA is that it will slow or stabilize the 
development of DRM technologies in the digital media space. 
This is perhaps counterintuitive, given that the DMCA itself 
purports to support and encourage the deployment of DRM. But 
counterintuitive or not, this aspect seems to be present. And 
while it is far too early to pronounce a verdict on the legacy of 
these provisions of the DMCA, it may be that the lasting 
contribution of the DMCA to the copyright law is as a set of rules 
that stabilized, moderated, and encouraged relatively weak forms 
of DRM.53 
IV. CONCLUSION: OR, HOW TO THINK ABOUT THE DMCA 
I suggest that the conventional wisdom about the DMCA—
as a simple, politically-driven “giveaway” of valuable rights to the 
content industries—misses both the real goal of the law as well 
as its importance in illuminating an emerging regulatory trend. 
The DMCA is fundamentally about the way that technology 
regulates, rather than a law about copyright. And understanding 
this point is important, both for our understanding of the 
copyright law, as well as for our thinking about the form and 
function of law in the modern regulatory environment. Indeed, 
the broader framework noted here is likely to have broad 
applicability to contexts beyond the digital content business. As 
software (and thus regulation-by-software) becomes increasingly 
ubiquitous in areas such as telecommunications and media 
creation and distribution, the relevance of analytic processes—
such as the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions—that address 
both law and software will only increase. 
 
                                                          
 53. Though the case is far from clear, there are good reasons to believe that “weak” 
forms of DRM might be a better solution than either “strong” or “no” forms. For an 
argument that the “leaky” nature of the copyright law is an essential feature, see Wagner, 
supra note 31, at 1010–16. 
